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Emile Durkheim’s Suicide documented a monotonically increasing relationship between age and 
suicide.  Such a relationship has been observed repeatedly since the beginning of the 19
th 
century, making it one of the most robust facts about suicide.  The differences in suicide rates by 
age are very large.  In the United States in 1950, for example, suicide rates were 4 times higher 
for adults (25-64) than for youths (15-24),
1 and 8 times higher for the elderly (65+) than for 
youths.  Economic theory explained this relationship naturally, with the young having the most 
life to loose and also having the least information about what their life will be like (Hamermesh 
and Soss, 1974). 
 
In recent decades, however, the monotonic relationship between age and suicide has disappeared.  
Figure 1 shows suicide rates by age in 1950 and 1990.  Between 1950 and 1990, youth suicide 
rates tripled (particularly among young men), while suicide rates for adults fell by 7 percent and 
suicide rates for the elderly fell by 30 percent. In 1990, suicide rates for young adults (ages 20-
24) were equal to those for prime-age adults, and were only 25 percent below suicide rates for 
the elderly.  Suicide is now the second or third leading cause of death for youth in the US, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and many countries of Western Europe. 
 
If youth suicide is an epidemic, attempted suicide is even more so.  For every teen that commits 
suicide (one-hundredth of one percent each year), 400 teens report attempting suicide (4 percent 
per year), 100 report requiring medical attention for a suicide attempt (1 percent per year), and 
30 are hospitalized for a suicide attempt (.3 percent per year).   
 
Why have youth suicide rates increased so much, even as suicide among adults and the elderly 
has fallen?  Why are there so many suicide attempts?  It is easier to say what suicide is not than 
what it is.  The US rise in youth suicide has not been centered in America’s troubled inner cities.  
The states with the largest increase in youth suicides between 1950 and 1990 are predominantly 
rural states: Wyoming, South Dakota, Montana, New Mexico, and Idaho.  The states with the 
most troubled inner cities in fact have the smallest increases: the District of Columbia, New 
                                                 
1 Throughout the paper, we refer to the 15-24 year-old age group as youths.  We sometimes divide this into 
teens (ages 15-19) and young adults (ages 20-24). 
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Jersey, Delaware, Massachusetts, and New York.  Indeed, when Durkheim wrote, suicide was 
primarily an urban phenomenon, but today youth suicides are 15 percent more prevalent in rural 
areas than in urban areas.
2   
 
This paper examines some of the economic and social roots of youth suicide and suicide 
attempts.  Two stories are apocryphal of our results.  The first story is reported by Rene Diekstra 
(1989): 
 
“It was around noon on 12 August 1969 that 19-year old Jurgen Peters climbed 
the ladder on the outside of the water tower in the German city of Kassel. By the 
time he reached the top, a number of people were already gathering where the 
young man was at.  
It soon became clear that he intended to jump all the way down in an attempt to 
take his own life. Earlier that morning, Jurgen had been fired by his boss, a local 
garage owner for whom he worked as an apprentice mechanic. The reason had 
been that, upon being asked to test drive a client’s car, he instead had gone joy 
riding and in the process had severely damaged that car as well as two others. 
Bystanders called the police, who in turn called the fire department for assistance. 
A fire ladder was put out to the top of the tower, and one of the firemen tried to 
talk Jurgen out of his plan, without success, however. Then a girl he had been 
dating and liked very much was asked to talk with him. She succeeded in 
persuading him to give up his attempt.  
While stepping from the water tower onto the fire ladder and starting his descent, 
a couple of young men watching the scene began yelling: “Hey, coward, you 
don’t even have the guts to jump, do you?” and similar provocative remarks. One 
could observe Jurgen hesitating, interrupting his descent. Then all of a sudden he 
climbed up the ladder, hopped on the top of the tower and almost in one 
movement jumped off it. He died on the spot.”   
 
The second story occurs in South Boston, Massachusetts and was witnessed by one of the 
authors (Norberg, 1999).  Between December 30, 1996 and July 22, 1997, there was a suicide 
epidemic in the white, predominantly low-income community of South Boston.  The area 
affected is an economically mixed and historically embattled community of about 30,000, 
somewhat physically isolated from the rest of the city. Although the community had been well 
                                                 
2 Durkheim suggested that urban suicide was evidence for the role that traditional agrarian (and particularly 
Catholic) society plays in creating a well-functioning social environment.   
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represented in the city and state’s political leadership for many years, its political influence 
seemed to be declining. The community was perceived by many observers, both insiders and 
outsiders, as having been deeply stressed and demoralized by recent and rapid social changes. 
Political and economic factors which have affected the community over the last generation 
include high rates of poverty, organized crime, and substance abuse, and a history of political 
conflict with the rest of the city over school busing and public housing integration. Within the 
previous three years, there had been new social stresses, including welfare reform, changes in 
local political leadership, a major crackdown on the organized crime leadership in the 
community, and privatization of city and state services with a loss of public sector jobs which 
had been the economic base for the community. 
 
In addition to these general social stresses, there had been a concurrent drug epidemic that may 
have been intimately related to the suicide epidemic. A nation-wide decrease in the price of 
heroin had resulted in an increase in heroin use by even very young adolescents in South Boston 
in 1995 and 1996. Other adolescents, not drug-users themselves, reported an increased feeling of 
anxiety in the face of the community’s manifest inability to stop this increase in serious 
adolescent drug use.  In early 1996, a 15 year-old boy died of an accidental drug overdose in one 
of the housing projects in the community. Just before this overdose, he had made a name for 
himself by stabbing a man who was accused of raping his sister. By report, more than a thousand 
people attended this boy’s wake and funeral; teenagers tattooed his name on their bodies, and the 
project hallways are still full of graffiti recording this boy’s name. He seems to have been 
memorialized, in part, because his death was seen as symbolic of a general crisis in the 
community. The first suicide of the epidemic occurred in the same housing project, close to the 
one-year anniversary of his death. 
 
By the end of the epidemic, there had been six hanging deaths, all young white males, along with 
48 serious but non-lethal suicide attempts, including five nearly fatal hanging attempts resulting 
in medical intensive care unit hospitalizations (all young white males aged 15 to 17), eight 
intentional overdoses serious enough to require medical hospitalization in addition to psychiatric 
care, at least 35 other hanging, overdose, and other self-injury attempts, and 78 other crisis  
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evaluations resulting in psychiatric hospitalizations among adolescents primarily aged 15 to 17 in 
this community. The affected adolescents were more likely to be white and male, and more 
likely to be between the ages of 15 and 17, than children and youth receiving emergency 
psychiatric screenings in baseline years. Given an estimated population of about 1300 teenagers 
in this community between the ages of 14 and 17, this represents a 38-fold higher suicide rate in 
the community than the teen suicide rate for the country as a whole; at least a five-fold increase 
in cases requiring medical hospitalization; and a psychiatric hospitalization rate of almost ten 
percent of the adolescents in the community in a single narrow age group. Nearly all of the 
persons making suicide attempts during this time cited the completed suicides as one of the 
stressors affecting them. 36 of the 48 serious attempters reported being close to at least one of the 
teens who died.  
 
These two stories foreshadow several questions that we address in this paper: What social 
stressors (such as the lost job for Jurgen and the heroin epidemic in Boston) are associated with 
the rise in youth suicide?  What is the role of other high-risk behavior (the joy ride, stabbing a 
community violator) in prompting crises leading to suicide? What is the role of peer pressure or 
social contagion in youth suicide?   
 
We examine these issues of suicide and suicide attempts using two sources of data. The first is 
vital statistics data on youth suicides.  These data are available at the aggregate level since the 
turn of the century and at the micro level since 1968.  We briefly describe national time trends 
since 1900, and examine state-level cross-sectional data for 1950 and 1990, and county-level 
cross-sectional data for 1990.  National data record all deaths, but the attribution of deaths by 
cause is somewhat problematic.  This is most important in the coding of suicidal vs. accidental 
deaths.  For example, a youth who dies of a self-inflicted gun wound may be called a suicide or 
an accidental death; many single-car motor vehicle fatalities are thought to be probable suicides, 
although they are usually classified as accidents.   In prior years, when there was more stigma 
associated with suicide, the share of deaths coded as accidents was higher and the share coded as 
suicides was lower.  As we discuss below, we do not think that reporting changes materially 
affect our conclusions about the reasons for increasing suicide over time. 5     
 
 
National data on youth suicide attempts are not available. Instead, to study suicide attempts, we 
turn to the National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health, also known as AddHealth.  The 
AddHealth study surveys a nationally representative sample of about 20,000 teenagers, their 
parents and social peers. We examine data from the first wave of this study, which took place in 
1996.   The AddHealth survey asks youths about suicidal thoughts, suicide attempts, and whether 
the attempt required medical treatment.  It also gathers a broad range of demographic and social 
information. 
 
Our empirical analysis leads us to three conclusions.  First, we argue that there is a fundamental 
distinction between suicide attempts and suicide completions.  While successful suicide is 
usually the result of a strongly held intent to end one’s life, most suicide attempts are probably 
not.  Instead, many suicide attempts can best be seen as a strategic action on the part of youths to 
resolve conflicts within oneself, with parents, or with others.  Youth have little direct economic 
or familial power, and in such a situation, self-injury can act as a powerful distress signal.  It can 
also serve to punish other persons (playing off others’ empathetic or altruistic inclinations) or to 
embarrass or “blackmail” persons who “should” be altruistic towards oneself, if the gesture 
draws the attention of outside authorities or other persons whose opinion matters to the reluctant 
altruist. 
 
Many factors suggest that the bulk of suicide attempts are strategic.  For example, women 
attempt suicide 50 percent more than men, but complete suicide 6 times less frequently.  
Attempted suicides peak for 15 year olds, while completed suicide rates climb sharply between 
ages 15 and 20.  Finally, youth suicide attempts are greater in families where youths may have 
more to gain from a shift in resources.  
 
Second, we find strong evidence that social interactions are important in teen suicide.  
Teenagers are much more likely to attempt suicide when they know someone else who has 
attempted suicide, and suicides are ‘clumped’ across areas in a way suggesting local spillovers. 
Spillovers may occur in several ways: attempts by one person may be more credible if it follows  
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attempts by others; authorities may take a second suicide attempt more seriously than the first; 
people might learn about effective techniques from others (for example, exactly how much 
medication it takes to get sick, but not die); or youths may provoke other youths to attempt 
suicide if the alternative is bringing shame to one’s group by a public display of stress.  The 
presence of social interactions means that small differences in aggregate fundamentals can 
trigger large shifts in the number of youth suicides. 
 
The importance of peer interaction in youth suicides was noted by Durkheim a century ago, and 
has been supported by other investigators in the current era (Gould et al, 1994).  Contagion 
effects are far less evident for adults and the elderly, suggesting that social interactions are less 
important for these groups.   
 
Third, we find that to the extent we can explain the rise in youth suicide over time, the most 
important aggregate variable explaining this change seems to be the increased share of youths 
living in homes with a divorced parent.  To a lesser extent, higher female labor force 
participation rates also explain increased male suicide rates.  Divorce rates at the county, state, 
and national level are highly correlated with youth suicide rates.  The divorce rate is more highly 
correlated with youth suicides than is the share of children living with step-parents or the share 
of children in single parent families (both divorced and never married parents).   Female labor 
force participation is another potential factor.  Higher female labor force participation predicts 
higher rates of suicides, particularly for males.  At the individual level, we find that family 
structure and parental time budgets also seem to matter for youth suicide attempts, albeit to a 
much less important degree than at the aggregate level for youth suicide.  Both of these factors 
predict youth suicide more strongly than they predict adult suicide. 
 
We begin by presenting basic facts about youth suicides and suicide attempts.  The second 
section discusses different theories about teen suicides.  The third section presents data on 
suicide attempts from a nationally representative survey in 1996, and the fourth section examines 
county, state, and national data on completed suicides.  The last section concludes. 
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I.   Facts about Suicide 
 
We begin with some basic facts about suicide, to set the stage for our later analysis.  While some 
of the facts are well known, others are not.   
 
1.   Since 1950, suicide has tripled among youths and fallen among older adults and the 
elderly.  
Figure 1, noted above, shows the change in suicide rates by age from 1950 to 1990.  Suicide 
rates for youths tripled between 1950 and 1990, rising from 4.5 per 100,000 to 13.8 per 100,000.  
In contrast, suicide among adults has fallen by 10 percent and suicide among the elderly has 
fallen by half.   
 
To highlight the differing trends by age, Figure 2 shows suicide rates by age at decadal intervals 
over the 20
th century.  Suicide rates first peaked about 1910.  Suicide rates for adults and 
particularly the elderly rose again in the Great Depression and have fallen substantially since 
then.  Total suicide rates in 1997 are the same as they were in 1950.  Suicide rates for youth, in 
contrast, declined by 2.5 percent per year from their peak in 1908 through their trough in 1955, 
and since then have risen by 2.4 percent per year. 
 
There is an increase in youth suicide rate for every single year of age, as shown in Figure 3.  
Between 1970 and 1980, the percentage increase was roughly the same for all ages.  Since 1980, 
suicide rates increased most rapidly among teenagers aged 15-19.    
 
One possible explanation for the rise in teen suicides is that teen deaths might have been coded 
as accidents in previous years.  While this is certainly true to some extent, it does not change our 
findings materially.  Figure 4 shows the suicide rate, the gun accidental death rate, and the 
combined suicide and gun accident rate for youths over time.  Unfortunately, we cannot include 
motor vehicle fatalities since motor vehicle deaths change for so many other reasons over time 
(such as changes in car safety and legal driving speeds).  The gun accident rate declined over  
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time, but by nowhere near as much as the suicide rate increased.  Thus, the rise in suicide and 
gun accident deaths mirrors the rise in suicide alone. 
 
The fact that suicide rates trend differently for young adults, older adults, and the elderly 
suggests that different factors may be at work for the three groups in the population.  This is true 
cross-sectionally as well.  The correlation across states between youth and adult (elderly) suicide 
rates is only .46 (.49), while the correlation between adult and elderly suicide rates is .89.   
 
2.   Suicide is the third leading cause of death among youths. 
US Vital Statistics records indicate that the annual suicide rate for youths (15-24) is about 13 per 
100,000, or .01 percent per year.  Over the course of 10 years, therefore, about .1 percent of 
youths will commit suicide.  The leading cause of death for youths is accidents (an annual rate of 
38.5 per 100,000 in 1995), followed by homicide (an annual rate of 20.3 per 100,000). 
 
3.   There are about 200 to 400 suicide attempts among youths for every completed suicide. 
There are no national surveillance figures in the United States for suicide attempts; estimates 
therefore come from a few national surveys, and from local surveillance.  As with suicide deaths, 
there is ambiguity in measuring suicide attempts.  There is wide variation in the lethality of 
intent; thus, the definition of a “suicide attempt” varies considerably from one study to another. 
The term “parasuicide” is sometimes used to refer to self-injury with low likelihood of lethal 
outcome (for example, superficial cutting, minor overdoses), and “deliberate self-harm” is 
sometimes used to refer collectively to self-injuries across the full spectrum of lethality of intent.  
 
Our data on suicide attempts come from the Adolescent Health Survey (AddHealth).  Suicide 
attempts in AddHealth (described in more detail below) are based on self-reports, and leave the 
definition of “suicide attempt” open to the responding interviewee. Table 1 shows data from 
AddHealth on suicide thoughts and attempts and from Vital Statistics on successful suicides. 
 
About 14 percent of youths report thinking of suicide in the past year, and 4 percent report 
attempting suicide.  About 1 percent of youths reported being seen medically for a suicide 9     
 
attempt.  Other data from the National Hospital Discharge Survey indicate that about 0.2 percent 
of youths are hospitalized for self-injury each year.  As shown in the last column, these numbers 
are substantially greater than the fatal suicide rate.  There are about 300 self-reported suicide 
attempts, about 100 “medically seen” suicide attempts, and about 16 medically hospitalized 
suicide attempts for every completed suicide. 
 
These numbers in themselves suggest that not all teen suicide attempts are truly youths who wish 
to die.  Many youths may instead be engaged in ‘strategic’ suicide attempts – suicide attempts of 
varying severity, designed to get attention, to punish parents or other role models for perceived 
mistreatment, or to embarrass parents or other family members.  Indeed, common sense suggests 
that succeeding at suicide is not all that difficult.  After all, either tall buildings or rope are often 
available, half of all households own a gun, and medications such as aspirin or acetomenophen 
are even easier to find, and less frightening to use.  As such, unsuccessful attempts must usually 
be thought of as actions which are, for the most part, designed to elicit a response other than 
one’s own death.  Successful attempts, on the contrary, most probably reflect a desire to actually 
end one’s life.  As such, we will discuss the theories of successful suicides and suicide attempts 
separately.  
 
4.   Girls attempt suicide more often than boys; boys commit suicide more often than girls.  
Table 1 shows suicide rates for various demographic groups.  The rate of suicide attempts is 
twice as high for girls as for boys, but the rate of successful suicides is 6 times higher for boys 
than for girls.  Differences in suicide rates are evident throughout the life cycle.  Figure 5 shows 
suicide rates by age and gender.  Male suicide rates are roughly 3 times female rates for adults, 
before increasing dramatically after age 65.  Female rates, in contrast, have a relative peak in late 
middle-age. 
 
5.   Suicide attempts decrease with age after adolescence.   
Table 2 shows suicide attempts by single year of age for youths (from AddHealth) and adults 
(from Crosby et al., 1999).
3  The peak age for suicide attempts is 15; attempt rates for 18 year-
                                                 
3 These data are from a recent telephone survey of a nationally representative sample of adults.  
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olds are 15 percent below the rate for 15 year-olds.
4  Suicidal thoughts decline in frequency from 
middle adolescence into adulthood and older years. 
 
6.   Rates of suicide and homicide are positively correlated in the national data. 
Figure 6 shows suicide and homicide rates over time.  There is a clear positive correlation 
between the two.  Both rates rose substantially from 1910 through 1930 and then fell through 
1960.  In both cases, rates rose again through 1975.  Total suicide rates began to fall again in the 
mid-1980’s, while homicide rates fell in the early 1980s, rose in the late 80’s and early 90’s, and 
then have again fallen since 1994.  The association between suicide and homicide is even 
stronger for youths, as shown in Figure 7.  Both rates rose from 1910 through 1933, fell over the 
next 20 to 30 years, and then began a prolonged increase, with a recent fall in both beginning in 
1994. 
 
7.   Rural, western states have the highest youth suicide rates and the fastest rate of increase. 
Figure 8 shows the geographic dispersion in youth suicide rates in 1950 and 1990.  Table 3 
shows the states with the highest and lowest suicide rates.  Because Alaska and Hawaii were not 
states in 1950, they are not included in the figure.  Suicide rates in 1990 are above those in 1950 
for all states.  But there is substantial dispersion in changes in suicide rates over time.  In 1950, 
suicide rates averaged 4.6 per 100,000, with a standard deviation of 2.0 (1.3 without Nevada).  In 
1990, the average rate was 15.3 with a standard deviation of 5.4.   
 
Most surprisingly, suicide rates in 1990 are highest in rural, Mountain states and lowest in urban, 
Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states.  The highest suicide rates in 1990 are in Alaska, 
Wyoming, Montana, New Mexico, and South Dakota.  This pattern became particularly 
pronounced between 1950 and 1990.  Montana, New Mexico, and Wyoming were high in 1950, 
but not as far above average; South Dakota was actually below average.  These states replaced 
states that were relatively rural in 1950 but became more urban over the time period: California, 
Utah, and Arizona.   
                                                 
4 A peak at around age 15 is also found for suicide attempts among girls in Oregon. 
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The states with the lowest suicide rates also changed.  In 1950, the lowest suicide rates were 
generally in Southern states (Alabama, Tennessee, Mississippi, and Arkansas).  By 1990, the 
lowest suicide states were the District of Columbia, New Jersey, Delaware, Massachusetts, and 
New York. 
 
The high rate of suicide in Mountain states does not appear to result from coding differences 
between accidents and suicides.  The correlation between teen suicide rates and teen accidental 
death rates in 1990 is .50. 
 
8.   Blacks attempt and complete fewer suicides than whites. 
Table 1 shows racial differences in suicide attempts and completions.  Blacks attempt suicide 
about one-quarter less frequently than do whites, and complete suicides about one-third less. The 
lower rate of suicide for blacks than whites suggests that youth suicides are not just a result of 
poor economic prospects.  By any measure, whites have much greater economic prospects than 
do blacks.  This ethnic difference also argues against some family composition explanations, 
such as the hypothesis that the lack of a father in the household leads to more youth suicides.  
However, during the 1980's, suicide rates increased most rapidly among young black males, so 
some changing factors are clearly important in this relationship.   
 
9.   Economic differences are moderately correlated with suicide rates. 
The last rows of Table 1 show suicide thoughts and completions in urban and rural areas, and 
between richer and poorer families.
5  Suicidal thoughts are moderately higher in urban areas, 
although suicide rates are higher in rural areas.  Youths in poorer families are more likely to 
attempt and complete suicide than youths in richer families.  These economic differences are not 
overwhelmingly large; the difference between rich and poor areas, for example, is much smaller 
than the difference in suicide between blacks and whites, and between boys and girls. 
 
                                                 
5 In the last rows, the suicide rate is based on whether the county had median income above or below 
average.  
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10.   Teen suicide is primarily accomplished with guns. 
Table 4 shows the methods that youths use to commit suicides in 1950 and 1990.  In both years, 
the overwhelmingly large share of deaths results from guns.  Guns were 50 percent of deaths in 
1950 and 64 percent in 1990.  Hanging is second most important in 1990, followed by poison.  
Suicide rates by all methods except poison have increased over time.  The increase is particularly 
pronounced for gun deaths. 
 
The predominance of guns in teen suicides and the association between rural, mountainous states 
and suicide initially inclines one towards a means theory of higher suicide rates: the availability 
of guns has increased youth suicides.  The cross-state evidence suggests otherwise, however:  if 
anything, we would expect that guns were relatively more available in rural, mountainous states 
in 1950 than in 1990.  
 
In contrast to successful suicides, suicide attempts almost never use guns.  Poison is used in over 
80 percent of suicide attempts (for example, drug overdoses).  
 
 
II.  Suicide among Youths: Theory 
 
In explaining youth suicide attempts and completions, we start off with two basic facts.  The first 
fact is that people have variable feelings.  Everyone has high and low moments.  For youths, the 
variability of emotions is particularly great.  Evidence suggests that the highs are higher and the 
lows lower for youths than for adults.  The second fact is that youths do not have financial 
resources that they can use to influence others.  Youths are still at the point in life where their 
consumption exceeds their net income. 
 
These two facts suggest a number of different explanations for youth suicide.  We group the 
alternative explanations into four categories.  The first explanation is the strategic suicide theory: 
youths attempt suicide to signal to others that they are unhappy, or to punish others for their 
unhappiness.  In this theory, suicide attempts are not primarily designed to result in death.  13     
 
Rather, they are a way for youths to influence others in non-financial ways.  The second theory is 
the depression theory: at various points, youths become sufficiently unhappy that they 
“rationally” take their life.  The third theory is the contagion theory; it is really an extension of 
the first two theories, suggesting that a “social multiplier” may amplify the effects of stressors 
leading to depression, or may amplify the effects of factors leading to suicidal signaling as a 
method of conflict resolution among youth.  The fourth theory has less to do with events that 
produce suicidal thoughts and more to do with the ability to carry out suicidal plans.  We term 
this the instrumentality theory: when youths become particularly unhappy, they commit suicide 
if the means to do so are readily available.  Thus, youth with access to guns will, for the same 
level of unhappiness, have higher suicide rates than will youth without access to guns.  We 
illustrate each of these potential effects in turn. 
 
 
The Rational Suicide Theory 
 
Our first theory is the most conventional one: suicide is a means of “rationally” ending one’s life 
when the expected value of the future utility of being alive is below the value of death.  The 
rational suicide theory was developed by Hamermesh and Soss (1974) as a way of explaining 
why suicide seemed to increase monotonically with age.  We have already seen that this 
monotonic increase with age is no longer true generally.  Indeed, it was not even true for women 
at the time that their original paper was written. We further show in the appendix that the simple 
prediction of rising suicide rates with age does not necessarily follow from a rational suicide 
model.  But the intuition holds.  Suicide is more likely when the variability of happiness is high, 
when unhappiness is correlated over time, and when people have high discount rates.  If there is 
hyperbolic discounting then individuals may want to pre-commit not to kill themselves. 
 
Suicide and depression are clearly correlated for youths, as we show below.  The difficult 
question is how the rational theory can explain the increase in youth suicide over time.  It is 
possible that discount rates have risen over time for the young; changes in such an enduring 
individual characteristic could be the result of important changes in family structure or social  
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environment which determine the individual’s development of the capacity to regulate impulse.  
It is also possible that mean utility levels in youths have declined over time.  If this is the driving 
factor, however, it must concern goods which are not usually purchased in the market economy; 
we show below that youth suicide rates and poverty rates are negatively correlated in both cross-
section and time series.
6  A particularly plausible explanation is that the variance of the utility 
distribution has increased.  If the variance of utility is greater, more youths will fall below the 
utility level at which suicide is a rational action.   
 
We examine this by considering the factors that lead to depression among youths.  Work on 
happiness suggests that family connections tend to be particularly important in promoting 
happiness; for adolescents, the family may be an important buffer for the variability of emotions.  
Changes in family relations may have decreased this buffering role. Thus, one candidate 
explanation for the rise in teenage suicides is the increase in single parent families.  
Alternatively, divorce, the partial absence of a known father, and remarriage might be more 
important in producing teenage unhappiness than the absence of a parent entirely, because of 
conflict between ex-partners, conflict with a step-parent, or conflict with a non-resident parent 
whose availability may be less that the child desires.  The child may experience greater feelings 
of rejection and unhappiness when certain parental resources appear to exist, but are not being 
devoted to the child, than when it is clear that parental resources have been exhausted.  This may 
explain why youth suicides are lower among blacks than among whites, and why the suicide 
rates among black youth have been rising.   
 
The events that cause depression need not be rationally undertaken for the suicide itself to be 
“rational.”  A youth who discounts hyperbolically may take actions that bring short-term 
pleasure but long-term costs – stealing a car, for example, and getting caught; or taking illegal 
drugs; or engaging in premarital sex and getting pregnant.  The youth who was caught might 
prefer ex post not to have stolen the car, but conditional on being caught, the teen then faces the 
                                                 
6  Hamermersh finds that suicide and income are correlated at the occupation level, but this relationship is 
not that strong.  Moreover, the earlier Durkheim evidence suggests a negative relationship between suicide and 
income.   15     
 
prospect of coping with an acute, painful state in the present, in which the magnitude of the 
present pain (negative utility) exceeds the (discounted) present value of the possibly brighter 
future once the acute pain is past. The hyperbolic discounter has even more trouble than the 
“ordinary” discounter in moderating present pain with the hope for future pleasure– just as he 
has trouble moderating present exuberance with the anticipation of future pain.  
 
Much unhappiness in teens may be related to romantic issues.  In the same way that divorce is 
closely linked with suicides among adults, increasingly early sexual intimacy may contribute to 
intense turbulence in the relationships between adolescent sexual partners; disappointments, 
conflict, and rejection in these physically intimate relationships among immature partners may 
lead to acute despair.  It is possible that increased sexual activity among teenagers, stimulated by 
a number of factors since the 1960’s, including the increased availability of safer and  more 
effective contraception, has been a cause of youth unhappiness and increased suicide.   
 
 Families may be important in preventing youths from undertaking these types of actions, and the 
decline of the traditional family type may thus have led to increased suicide through its influence 
on impulsive, long-term detrimental behavior.  It is important to note that engaging in these 
activities may increase happiness among youths on average, but may still lead to more variance 
in happiness, resulting in more youth suicides. 
 
Beyond the immediate family, membership in social organizations is also a strong correlate with 
happiness.  The decline in social capital discussed by Putnam (1994) may have created a rise in 
teenage unhappiness; indeed, Durkheim argued that traditional societies with tight social 
connections had lower suicide rates.   
 
 
The Strategic Suicide Theory  
 
A second explanation for youth suicide may be that suicidal behavior is not designed to produce 
death, but merely to signal unhappiness and thus change the distribution of family resources.  We  
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think of this theory as applying to attempted suicides more than suicide completions.  The value 
of suicide as a signal may be direct or indirect.  In some cases, the signal will convince adults 
that children are truly unhappy and thus parents will devote more monetary or time resources to 
the child.  Such a signal may be particularly credible in a repeated interaction.  In other cases, the 
parent might not want to distribute more resources to the child, but the internal or external 
psychic cost (perhaps embarrassment) at having a child attempt suicide will induce the parent to 
provide more resources.  If parents are sufficiently powerful in all respects, then self-harm may 
offer the only means available to the child of punishing the parents.   
 
To formalize this, we consider a child with utility function V(T, Z), where T is the amount of 
time or money the parent transfers to the child and Z is a vector of  other factors that influence 
child happiness.  Parents derive utility from their own consumption [U(Y-T)] and the happiness 
of their child [aV(T, Z)].  The child’s happiness, Z, is known to the child but not to the parent. 
 
Children who are unhappy may want more parental input.
7  If child utility is not observable to 
the parent, children need to signal this unhappiness to parents.  Suicide attempts are a credible 
signal if there is some probability that they succeed and if the utility loss from death is smaller 
for unhappy children.  The appendix shows that if parents have no observable information about 
child happiness, the equilibrium is where children with Z<Z* attempt suicide and children with 
Z>Z* do not.  The appendix also shows that suicide attempts are more common where Y is 
higher and thus there are more resources that suicide can help transfer.   
 
The intuition for these results is simple.  Children will want to communicate their unhappiness to 
parents so that they can get more resources.  Suicide is a signal of this because a child who is less 
happy values future life less than one who is happier.  As a result, children know that attempting 
suicide will convince their parents they are not happy.  But for the signal to be transmitted, it 
must be the case that sometimes the event happens – on occasion, the child must die. 
 
                                                 
7 Formally, this is a statement that d
2V/dTdZ<0 – the value of parental resources is greater when the child 
is exogenously less happy. 17     
 
This prediction that suicide attempts will be more common when parental resources are greater – 
because there is more to redistribute – is the central prediction for the strategic suicide theory.  
This is opposite to the pure depression theory, where low parental resources induces low child 
happiness and thus increased suicide attempts.  We test for strategic suicide by examining how 
suicide attempts are related to family structure and income.  
 
The Contagion Theory 
 
Durkheim argued that suicides were imitative.  He gives the example of 15 prisoners who hung 
themselves from exactly the same hook in a Parisian prison and argues that this shows the power 
of social imitation. Several epidemiological studies (for example Gould et al, (1994)) suggest 
that social contagion is a stronger factor for teenage suicides and suicide attempts than for adults.  
It is not surprising to find that adolescents seem to be particularly influenced by their peer group 
in this form of high risk behavior.  
 
Contagion may operate in several ways.  A member of a group who commits suicide may cause 
grief and stress within the group; this stress may decrease the ability of the group to buffer the 
problems faced by others members of the group or make suicide among other members more 
rational.  People may also learn from suicidal behavior of others: they may gain more exact 
information about the pain or discomfort involved in a particular action, and they may gain 
information about its probable effectiveness in accomplishing some end.   
 
An important mechanism may involve the increase in the signal value of a suicide if some 
aspects become stylized. If a fifteen year old boy commits suicide, then other fifteen year old 
boys may draw more than the usual amount of attention for similar behaviors. If one person 
attempts or completes suicide using a particular method, then others may draw more than the 
usual attention by using a similar method, within the time frame when the environment is 
sensitized to respond. As the signal becomes more stylized, the “receiver” can become more 
sensitive in detecting the signal. As the signal reception increases in sensitivity, the minimum 
effective signal can become less intense: social contagion may therefore lead to an increase in  
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frequency, but a decrease in severity, of suicide attempts. Since bad news is more often reported 
than good news, an increase in the effective group size to which adolescents are exposed (which 
could have occurred, for example, through the growth of the role of television: e.g., Phillips and 
Carstensen, (1986)), could directly contribute to a rise in the rate of suicide.   
 
At a certain point, the environment may “catch on” to the changing significance of the stylized 
attempt and react to less severe attempts with less attention.  This may reduce suicide attempts 
from those with only a small desire to attempt suicide.  But a more sinister form of social 
contagion may also be set in motion. Members of a group may collude to (covertly) provoke an 
escalation of tactics leading to the martyrdom of at least one member of the group.  One 
successful suicide (especially if widely advertised) may greatly refresh the credibility of the less-
lethal threats made by other members.     
 
This may have been the basis for the provocations described in the case of Jurgen Peters. It is not 
so much that the other young men in the crowd were acutely suicidal – presumably they were a 
more or less random draw of young men who happened to be nearby, with no more than the 
average share of despair typical for young men in that community at that time – but they may 
have identified with Jurgen’s age and gender, and each young man in the crowd might have 
expected his own reputation for possible dangerous action to rise with Jurgen’s violent death. In 
fact, if they did not know him, his death may have been no loss to them at all – only an 
emblematic event which enhanced their own strategic position in the community.  
 
And the South Boston story highlights many of these potential effects.  The first suicide became 
a martyr; other teens who were not so affected by violence wanted to imitate him.  And as the 
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The Instrumentality Hypothesis  
 
The final theory is the instrumentality hypothesis– that access to lethal means increases suicides.  
This theory stresses the immediate costs and benefits of suicide, not the long-term forward 
thinking behavior of the other models.  In this theory, suicide is impulsive, and access to the 
appropriate method at the right time can determine whether a suicide occurs or not. 
 
The instrumentality explanation is most commonly told about access to guns.  As we saw above, 
teenagers overwhelmingly commit suicides using guns.  Brent et al. (1993) show that adolescents 
who committed suicide were about four times as likely to live in a home with any gun than were 
a matched group of community or psychiatric controls, and were 32 times more likely to have 
lived in a home where a gun was kept loaded.  The availability of guns differs greatly over space 
and thus could explain some of the geographic distribution of youth suicide.  Beyond firearms, 
there is some evidence that differences in access to lethal methods – tall buildings in Manhattan 
(Marzuk et al, 1992), coal gas in the United Kingdom, may be associated with differences in 
rates of completed suicide.   
 
The counter hypothesis is that lethal means of one kind or another – for example, hanging, or 
jumping from a height – are so widely available that a suicidal person will simply substitute one 
method for another, depending on which one is more accessible.   A classic example is bridge 
barriers: if one bridge is fenced, the suicidal person may simply find another nearby bridge to use 
instead (O’Carroll and Silverman, 1993). 
 
The strongest evidence against the instrumentality theory is noted above: youth suicide rates 
have increased the most in areas where guns have historically been the most plentiful – rural, 
western states.  The instrumentality theory would predict the opposite, that suicide rates would 
rise most in urban areas with high poverty, where guns have become increasingly common in 
more recent years.  
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There could be another, more subtle role for instrumentality, linked to the social contagion 
models described above. Perhaps there has been an increase in non-lethal suicide attempts, 
driven by an increase in the availability of dangerous but usually non-lethal methods: for 
example, prescription psychotropic medications, which came into more common use starting in 
the 1960’s.   
 
III.  Evidence on Suicide Attempts 
 
We start our empirical analysis by looking at suicide attempts.  We examine attempts with an eye 
to which of our four theories appears to offer the best prediction of adolescent self-injury.   
 
The data that we use are from the National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health 
(AddHealth).  AddHealth is a nationally representative stratified random sample of US high 
school students in 9
th to 12
th grades; the survey is based on direct interviews of the adolescents 
themselves, their parents, and school administrators, and covers a wide range of topics 
concerning risk and protective factors for high risk adolescent behavior.  Our sample consists of 
17,004 adolescents between the ages of twelve and eighteen in 1996, for whom we have the 
necessary observations from the first wave of the AddHealth survey.  The key features of the 
results presented here are also observable when we consider outcomes in wave 2, but the 25 
percent sample attrition between waves makes these results less statistically significant. 
 
Our primary dependent variable is whether the youth reported a medically-screened suicide 
attempt.  We focus on medically-screened attempts to get some measure of severity of attempt.  
Reporting issues may also influence whether some youths tell a surveyor about less severe 
suicide attempts.  We also examine reports of suicide attempts whether or not they were treated 
medically.  Our results are very consistent across these two samples.  We note one obvious 
feature of this sample: youths who successfully committed suicide are not in the sample.  Thus, 
this data tells us about the determinants of ‘unsuccessful’ suicide attempts only.  Four per cent of 21     
 
teens reported making a suicide attempt in wave 1, and 1 per cent reported a suicide attempt that 
resulted in some kind of medical contact.
8   
 
We relate the probability that the teen has made a suicide attempt to a variety of factors 
reflecting our different theories above.  Table 5 describes these variables and shows the means 
and (where appropriate) standard deviations.  Our first measures are demographic controls: age 
(in single years), gender, ethnicity, and urban residence. 
 
To capture family resources, we include family income and employment variables.  The strategic 
suicide theory argues that more family resources should increase suicide attempts.  The rational 
suicide explanation argues that more family resources should decrease suicide attempts, if lower 
levels of resources are associated with less happiness among youths. 
 
We also include measures of family structure and interactions with parents: how often mother 
and father are home in the evening; whether there is a father present physically or in the life of 
the teen, and the teen’s relationship with their mother, with a resident father, and with a non-
resident father.  The relationship variables are measured on a five-point scale aggregating 
questions about the frequency of specific activities and interactions between the teen and parent.  
The strategic theory suggests that having a father present but not around should increase suicide 
attempts, as should a worse relationship with parents.  The depression theory suggests that being 
without a father entirely should be worse than having a parent around but not in the household. 
 
We include a variety of measures of activities of the teen, including measures of sexual activity 
(a dummy variable for whether the teen has ever had sexual intercourse; a dummy for whether 
the teen has been raped); measures of violence and delinquency (a normalized delinquency 
score; whether the teen has ever used a weapon, and whether the teen was hurt by violence); 
measures of drug and alcohol use (dummies for hard drug use or alcohol problems); and 
participation in various clubs (the total number of clubs, membership in an honor society; 
whether the child participates in sports; and the number of hours per week spent watching TV).  
                                                 
8  0.7 percent of teens reported making a medically-screened attempt in wave 2.    
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These partly measure happiness and partly measure the potential for conflict.  The happiness 
theory suggests that teens that engage in these activities but have bad outcomes should attempt 
suicide more. 
 
A clear issue with these variables is the endogeneity problem: children who take drugs more, for 
example, may be more likely to attempt suicide for other reasons.  Without instruments for these 
teen activities, we cannot resolve the causality question.
9  We thus primarily think of these 
regressions as correlations more than a strict theory of causation.  Some inferences can be made, 
however, by comparing the effect of different activities on suicide rates.  The happiness 
explanation argues that teens that engage in these activities but suffer adverse outcomes (for 
example, being arrested for drug use) would be more likely to commit suicide.  Teens that 
engage in these activities but do not suffer adverse outcomes, however, would be no more likely 
to commit suicide. 
 
We also include measures of social contagion: whether a relative or friend has attempted suicide, 
and whether a relative or friend has died by suicide.  These variables permit particularly valuable 
tests of the social contagion theory.
10 
 
Table 6 shows our regression results.  We report OLS estimates for ease of interpretation; logit 
and probit models had very similar qualitative and quantitative results (when expressed as 
changes in probabilities).  Recall that the dependent variable mean is 1 percent, so small 
coefficients are to be expected.  The first column of the table includes the basic demographic 
variables (which are included in all regressions) and the variables for family income and 
employment.  The first row shows that girls are 0.8 percentage points, or 56 percent, more likely 
                                                 
9  While AddHealth has a longitudinal component, even longitudinal data would not solve the endogeneity problem.  
It would still be necessary to know why teens start to engage in these activities.   
 
10  One might worry somewhat about depression running in families and thus there being a common genetic 
component to suicide.  Our results are similar for friends and relatives, however.  One might also be worried about 
the self-selection of friends.  Without instruments for one’s friends (and it is not clear what such instruments might 
be) we do not have a way of addressing this issue. 
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to report a relatively serious suicide attempt than boys. This is consistent with the raw data 
above: boys complete suicides more than girls; but girls attempt suicide more than boys.  The 
next set of variables indicate ethnicity; Native American teens have 67 percent higher rates, 
Asian-American teens have 23 percent higher rates, and African-American teens have 10 percent 
lower suicide attempt rates than white teens.  These rates are not statistically significant, 
although they are statistically significant predictors of having attempted a suicide (whether or not 
it was medically treated or not). 
 
There is a nonlinear relationship between suicide attempts and age. Attempted suicides rise from 
age 12 to age 15 (the omitted age dummy) and then decline.   This stands in stark contrasts to 
successful suicides, which rise sharply over these ages.  One possible explanation for these 
results is that teenage independence increases at age 16, for example the ability to drive.  As such 
the need to either signal parents or punish them through self-damage may decrease with 
increasing age.    
 
The next variables in the first column are for family economic status.  Increased income reduces 
suicide attempts.  A one standard deviation increase in family income decreases the risk of 
suicide attempt by almost 40 percent. Similarly, individuals whose families receive welfare are 
30 percent more likely to attempt suicide.
11  It is unclear whether the welfare variable is picking 
up an income effect or a stigma effect; 1996 (the year of the first wave of AddHealth) was the 
year in which welfare reform was enacted into law, and thus discussion of welfare in a negative 
context was prominent.  The income variables generally support the happiness explanation over 
the strategic explanation.   
 
The second regression replaces the economic variables with family structure variables.  Teens 
who live with a single parent have about twice the rates of suicide attempts than those in two-
parent families, even when one of the parents is a stepparent.    Most surprisingly, we find that 
teens who know their father, but whose father is not now in the home are just as likely to attempt 
                                                 
11  In regressions that separate effects by gender, the welfare effect was particularly important for girls. 
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suicide than teens that never knew their father.  This is suggestive evidence of the strategic 
theory: suicide attempts may be a means to get an absent father to pay more attention to his 
children. 
 
As the next rows show, teens that engage in more activities with their mother and non-resident 
father are less likely to attempt suicide.  There is no such effect for relationship with a resident 
father.  A one-standard-deviation increase in time spent with a mother decreases the risk of 
suicide attempt by about 27 percent.  This is a very substantial effect.   The effect of time with 
the non-resident father but not the resident father again suggests a strategic motive. 
 
The third regression considers the relationship between adolescent suicide attempts and other 
kinds of adolescent behavior. Sexual activity, rape, drug use, alcohol problems, and being hurt in 
a fight are among the strongest behavioral predictors of suicide attempts. Girls who report being 
raped are much more likely to attempt suicide than other girls.  Hard drug use more than doubles 
the risk of suicide attempt.  A one-standard deviation increase in minor delinquency increases the 
risk of suicide attempt by 25 percent. 
 
Teens that have hurt others are more likely to have attempted suicide, as are teens that have been 
hurt in conflicts.  The latter effect is particular large; teens who have been hurt in conflicts are 75 
percent more likely to attempt suicide.
12  Perhaps self-injurious impulses lead to getting hurt in a 
fight.  Alternatively, being fearful and bullied may precipitate self-injurious impulses.  
Membership in an honor society or engaging in weekly sports provided protection from the risk 
of making a suicide attempt, although not statistically significantly. 
 
It is difficult to make definitive conclusions about these variables because of the endogeneity 
problem. The evidence is clearly consistent with the happiness theory; teens in more trouble are 
more likely to attempt suicide.  But they may also reflect familial conflict, leading to strategic 
                                                 
12  In regressions by gender, boys who have been injured during a fight are 2 times as likely to attempt suicide.   
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motives.  Or they could simply reflect other aspects of teens that jointly influence suicidal 
attempts and happiness. 
 
The next regression considers the possible effects of social contagion.  Teens who know friends 
or family members who have attempted suicide are about three times more likely to attempt 
suicide than teens that do not know someone who attempted suicide.  As best we can tell, this 
finding is causal.  When we examine wave 2 data, teens that had not already made a suicide 
attempt in wave 1 are more likely to attempt suicide if they know a friend or relative who 
attempted suicide.  We also find that teens who have had a family member die of suicide are 
more likely to report a suicide attempt in wave 1, but only half as likely to make an attempt in 
wave 2, as other teens. This suggests a complex model of contagion, consistent with our strategic 
suicide hypothesis: teens who have experienced the suicide of an intimate may be sufficiently 
aware of the pain that this causes, that they are less likely to engage in a merely symbolic 
attempt. 
 
There are also significant gender differences in the pattern of social contagion.  In regressions 
separately for girls and boys, girls are more likely to make a suicide attempt if they know 
someone else who has made an attempt; boys are less affected by attempts of other people but 
more affected by knowing someone that completed suicide.  This suggests a social mechanism 
for the difference in completed suicide rates for boys and for girls.  Groups of boys may dare and 
shame each other into maintaining the group’s reputation for courage or dangerousness. Girls 
may be more willing to imitate a “failed” suicide attempt, because they do not require the same 
level of reputation for daring. 
 
The fifth column includes all of these different variables together.  The results are generally 
consistent with the regressions including the variables separately.  The factors most strongly 
related to suicide attempts are the interaction with parents, the teen activities variables, and the 
contagion variables. 
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In the final regression of the table, we add a measure of depression to the regression.  The scale 
used in the AddHealth survey is based on the CESD, a widely-used 16-item epidemiological 
self-report scale. The scale has been standardized with a mean of zero and a standard deviation 
of one. Unsurprisingly, we find that suicidal adolescents report higher rates of depression.  The 
effect is large; a one standard deviation increase in reported depression nearly doubles the 
suicide risk.  More surprisingly, the other variables in the regression generally still affect suicide 
attempts, even when the depression variable is included.  Most of the variables are smaller in 
magnitude in column (6) than in column 5, but they generally still predict suicide attempts.  
Thus, not all of the effect of these variables on suicides is through their influence on happiness. 
 
Table 7 presents estimates of similar models for the broader measure of whether the teen 
reported attempting suicide, independent of whether it was medically treated or not.  for ease of 
interpretation, we report only the results including all of the variables together (equivalent to 
column (5) of table 6), and that regression including the measure of depression (equivalent to 
column (6) of table 6).   
 
The results are similar to, and perhaps even stronger than, the results for medically-treated 
suicide attempts.  The signs of the coefficients are generally similar, but because the dependent 
variable has a much higher mean (4 percent) the coefficients are larger are more of them are 
statistically significant.  The most important variables predicting this measure of suicide attempts 
are interaction with mother and particularly a non-resident father, teen variables such as drug use 
and having been rapid, and the social contagion variables.  The age effects are also pronounced.  
Suicide attempts peak at age 14 and then decline through age 18.  Depression is clearly related to 
suicide attempts, but it does not fully explain this pattern of results.   
 
The Roots of Depression 
To understand the role of happiness in explaining suicide among youths, we consider the 
determinants of depression among teens.  We have already seen the relation between the teen 
variables and attempted suicides, both with and without depression as a control.  These auxiliary 
regressions will help us to determine which of these variables influence suicide through their 27     
 
impact on depression.  These variables are also useful as a test of our previous results.  Since 
suicide attempts are relatively rare, it may be that these depression results are more reliable than 
our results for suicide attempts.   
 
Table 8 relates the depression scale to the independent variables included in table 6.  The first 
regression in table 8 shows the relation between our demographic characteristics and depression 
(recall that the index has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one).  The age effects are 
sizable and different than for suicide attempts.  Younger teens are much less likely to be 
depressed than are older teens, by about one-third of a standard deviation.  Girls are more 
depressed than are boys.  Again the effect is large – nearly one-quarter of a standard deviation.  
All of the racial and ethnic minorities have higher rates of depression than whites.  Living in an 
urban area also increases depression.   
 
Income is positively and strongly associated with happiness.  Higher income reduces depression, 
and being on welfare increases depression.  There is no effect of mother’s labor force 
participation on depression. Economists may be surprised that the coefficient for income isn’t all 
that large.  Absent fathers and mothers appear to be more important than income in predicting 
depression among teenagers.    
 
The second regression shows that relationship with one’s parents is a very strong determinant of 
teenage depression.  Individuals who never knew their fathers are particularly likely to be 
depressed, even more so than the group that knows their father but whose father is not home.  
Note that these coefficients were about the same in the regressions for attempting suicide.  Teens 
who report more interactions with their parents are much less likely to be depressed. This effect 
is large and supports the idea that parental behavior can make a large difference to the happiness 
of teenagers.   
 
The third regression shows that sexual activity predicts depression. One explanation for this is 
that romantic turmoil may increase the volatility of emotions, but there are certainly other 
explanations.  Possibly, individuals who have not had sex live in more socially protective  
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environments that fight depression in other ways.  Use of drugs and alcohol is also related 
(unsurprisingly) with depression.   Again, the direction of causality for these variables is not 
completely clear.  Delinquency is also correlated with depression.  Having gotten hurt is a 
particularly strong positive predictor of depression, which may partially explain its earlier 
correlation with suicide attempts.  Indeed, in table 5 the coefficient on having gotten hurt falls 
nearly in half when the depression variable is included.  These variables may again reflect either 
direction of causality.  It may be, for example, that delinquency leads people to be unhappy or 
that unhappiness makes delinquency seem to be relatively more attractive.  
 
There is a significant relation between the social interactions and depression.   Teens who watch 
more TV are more depressed than are teens that watch less TV, and club membership is 
negatively related to depression.  This corresponds well with the well-known correlation between 
organization membership and happiness in adult surveys.  Honors society, sports members and 
religion all strongly reduce depression.   
 
It is interesting that the maximum R
2 in our depression model is only 16 percent.  The factors we 
identify are related to depression, but detailed as they are, there is substantial variance beyond 
these factors, and they work through other dimensions as well. 
 
Summary 
Our analysis of suicide attempts and teen depression leads us to three conclusions.  First, we find 
clear evidence for the happiness theory.  More depressed teens, or teens with other problems 
leading to poor life prospects are more likely to attempt suicide than are other teens.  This 
finding is not surprising.  Second, there is strong evidence of social contagion; having a friend or 
relative attempt or commit suicide increases the risk that a given teen does as well.  Third, there 
is suggestive evidence that the strategic theory is true as well.  The age pattern of suicide 
attempts matches the predictions of the strategic theory – particularly in light of opposite 
findings for depression – as do factors such as the characteristics of an absent father. 
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IV.  Completed Suicides 
 
Suicide attempts are only part of our interest.  We are also interested in the determinants of youth 
suicide itself.  In this section, we examine the factors that predict youth suicide. 
 
As with suicide attempts, we have data problems in measuring suicide completions.  In the case 
of suicide completions, there is very little data on the characteristics of individuals that commit 
suicide.  Death records contain some information, but generally nothing about the individual’s 
mood, their relation with others, their activities, etc.  Some psychological autopsy studies have 
been performed, but these too have problems: the samples are small and the information is often 
sketchy.   
 
Accordingly, we address the problem of suicide completions using a different tack.  We examine 
suicide rates at the national, state, and county level and consider what factors explain differing 
levels of suicide at a point in time and differing changes in suicide rates over time.  Our primary 
analysis is based on county-level average suicide rates for the 1989-91 time period.  Individual 
counties are only identified if they have over 100,000 people.  We thus form a sample of all 
counties identified individually and group the remaining counties into one observation for each 
state.  The result is a sample of 516 county groups.  Analysis of county groups is necessarily less 
convincing than having individual data, but in this circumstance individual data are simply not 
available. 
 
As noted above, suicide completions are very different from suicide attempts.  The two behaviors 
involve different methods and demographic groups.  Most psychological audit studies find that 
people who successfully commit suicide have an intention to die, where most people who 
attempt suicide probably do not.  Equivalently, we suspect that people who do not strongly want 
to die but do are a small share of total suicides.  Accordingly, we move away from 
considerations of strategic suicide attempts in our analysis of completed suicides.  We instead 
consider the factors that would lead to more people truly wishing to end their life.   
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This leaves us with three principal theories of suicide to test:  the rational theory; the contagion 
theory; and the instrumentality theory.  We examine the evidence for each of these theories in 
this section. 
 
A First Test of Contagion 
We start by considering possible evidence of contagion in suicide rates.  To do this, we borrow a 
technique from Glaeser et al. (1996) and examine the excess variance of suicide rates across 
areas.  The idea is simple.  If each individual has a probability p of committing suicide, different 
areas will on average have a share p of people commit suicide, with some variance around that.  
Because p is a binomial variable, the variance of the theoretical suicide rate across areas is 
known.  Contagion in suicide will make some counties have a higher suicide rate and other areas 
have a lower suicide rate.  This would show up as an excess variance of the suicide rate across 
counties, even if the mean suicide rate is unaffected.  Thus, a nonparametric test of suicide 
contagion is to compare the theoretical variance of suicide rates across counties with the actual 
variance of suicide rates across counties. 
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where Nj refers to the population of county j, pj is the suicide rate in county j and  US p  is the 
suicide rate in the U.S. as a whole.  If there are no social interactions, the index should take on a 
value of one.    
 
In evaluating youth suicides, the index value is 156 – substantially above the expected value.  
For adult suicide, the index value is 50 – still high, but much smaller than for youths.  By 
comparison, comparable numbers for robbery and murder are 400 and 10.   The implication is 
that teen suicide has significant social interactions, at least relative to adult suicide.   31     
 
 
Explaining Suicide Rates Across Counties 
In light of this result, we now look at several predictors of the youth suicide rate across counties, 
designed to proxy for our different theories.  Variable descriptions and means are reported in 
Table 9.  We include basic demographic controls for urbanicity (dummy variables for large 
urban area, small urban area, farm) and the share of the area that is black, Native American, and 
Asian American.  Our primarily explanatory variables are grouped into three categories.  The 
first variable is the logarithm of median income in 1989, taken from the 1990 Census.  In our 
regressions for suicide attempts, income was significantly negatively associated with attempted 
suicide.  The rational theory suggests that income should be negatively associated with 
completed suicides as well.   
 
Our second variables are measures of family characteristics – the share of women in the county 
who are divorced, the share of children who are step children, and the share of female-headed 
families.  These variables are similar to the family structure variables in our models for 
attempted suicide.  It is important to note that these variables refer to current living status as of 
the time of the 1990 Census.  For example, the female divorce rate is the share of women who 
are divorced and not remarried.  If the woman were remarried, she would report herself as 
married in the Census.  These measures are not ideal for our purpose (we would prefer to know 
the share of women who have ever been divorced) but this information is not available.  About 9 
percent of women are divorced, 5 percent of children live with a stepparent, and 18 percent of 
households are female-headed. 
 
Finally, to test the instrumentality theory, we include the share of people who own guns and the 
share of people who hunt.  Gun ownership is measured at the state level in the National Opinion 
Research Center’s General Social Survey between 1972 and 1994.  We aggregate these years to 
get precision; still, the variable is somewhat suspect because while the GSS is designed to be 
representative at the national level it is not representative at the state level.  The share of people 
who hunt is measured at the county level by the US Department of the Interior.  Close to half of 
all people own a gun, while only 8 percent hunt.  
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Table 10 shows regressions relating these variables to youth suicide rates.  The first regression 
includes just urbanicity and demographic controls.  The racial variables enter as expected.   
Percent black is (insignificantly) negative and percent Native American is significantly positive.  
Percent Asian is also positive.  This corresponds with the basic ethnic patterns described above.  
We find no particular relationship between urbanization and teen suicide across counties, but the 
percentage of population living on farms positively predicts suicide 
 
As the second column shows, there is a negative effect of median income on suicide rates, just as 
the economic model of suicide predicts.  As income increases by 25 percent roughly one 
standard deviation) the suicide rate drops by nearly 1.4 per 100,000, 11 percent of the mean 
amount.  This is a reasonably large effect.  Controlling for income causes the coefficients on race 
and urban status to become significant.   
 
The third regression shows the impact of the divorce rate in the county on suicide rates.  The 
divorce rate is strongly positive and quantitatively important.  As the divorce rate increases by 2 
percent (one standard deviation), the suicide rate rises by 2 per 100,000, 18 percent of the 
baseline amount.  The connection between divorce and suicide at the aggregate level is well-
known; Durkheim makes much of it.  The usual explanation for this relationship is that divorced 
individuals are more likely to commit suicide.  Clearly this is not the explanation for teen 
suicides.   
 
There are several possible explanations for the divorce variable.  One hypothesis is that more 
women work when the divorce rate increases, and having mothers working is bad for teens, 
because it reduces the amount of parental attention they receive.  The difference in female 
employment rates in the United States versus Europe has been cited by some as a reason for 
higher suicide rates among teens in the United States compared to Europe.  A second theory is 
that there are more female-headed families in areas where there are more divorces, and children 
in female-headed families are more likely to commit suicide.  From the AddHealth data, we 
know that the relation between single parent families and suicide attempts is not particularly 33     
 
strong, so we are somewhat skeptical of this theory.  A second explanation is that there are more 
step-children when divorce rates are higher, and conflict between step-children and their step-
parents increases suicide rates.  Again, we saw in AddHealth that there was little effect of a 
relationship with a resident father on suicide, so we are somewhat skeptical of this theory.  A 
third explanation is that when more women are divorced, teens know but have little contact with 
the absent father, and this leads to more suicides.  In the AddHealth data, the relationship with a 
non-resident father was strongly predictive of suicidal behavior.  A final explanation is that the 
divorce rate proxies for other factors of a community – social disorder, community conflict, 
general unhappiness, etc. – that influence youth suicide rates. 
 
To test these theories, we include measures of female labor force participation rates, the share of 
children who are step-children, and the share of families that are female-headed.  The fourth 
regression shows that the latter two variables are both related to suicides but female labor force 
participation is not.  The fifth column includes these three variables with the female divorce rate.  
Controlling for female divorce rates, the share of step-children and the share of female-headed 
families have a negative effect on youth suicides.  Having a father who was once in your 
household appears to be more important for suicides than being without a father at all.   
Unfortunately, we do not have information at the county level on contact between children and 
absent fathers, so we cannot differentiate between it and other explanations of community 
factors.  As such, the relationship between the divorce rate and the teen suicide rate remains 
somewhat of a puzzle.   
 
The next two columns show the relation between guns and youth suicide.  There is mild evidence 
for the instrumentality theory.  In areas where there is more hunting, suicide rates are higher.  
But this is not true about gun ownership, which we expect would be more closely related to 
youth suicides.  Further, the increase in suicide in rural areas, despite the much more rapid 
increase in gun ownership in urban areas, casts doubt on the instrumentality theory. 
 
The last column reports results for the suicide rate among adults.  The same factors may, or may 
not, predict adult and youth suicide rates.  We present the models primarily for comparison  
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purposes.  For adults, we find that income is a more significant predictor of suicide than it is for 
children.  Comparing the seventh and eights columns, the coefficient on income is small and 
statistically insignificant for youths but negative and statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level for adults.  The greater income effect for adults matches the time series evidence presented 
above.  Female divorce rates are also related to suicide rates for adults, but the magnitude is one-
third smaller than for youths.  This is again consistent with our theories and casual time series 
evidence.  Finally, we find no evidence that the other social characteristics affect adult suicide 
rates, and only weak evidence for the instrumentality theory. 
 
Changes in Suicide Rates Across States 
A second test of these theories is to see whether they predict changes in suicide rates over time.  
The suicide rate started to increase in about 1950, so we consider data from 1950 to 1990.  Data 
on suicide rates at the county level are not available prior to 1970.  Accordingly, we focus on 
analysis at the state level.  Such analysis is less than ideal; there were only 49 states in 1950, 
(including Washington, DC), so our standard errors are large.  We thus consider the state-level 
analysis to be more suggestive than definitive. 
 
Table 11 reports regression results for changes in state suicide rates between 1950 and 1990.  
The first column reports results for youths, and the second column reports results for total 
suicides.  The regressions do not include data on gun ownership or hunting; such information is 
not available over time.  The specification is thus equivalent to column (5) of table 10.  The 
income effects are consistent for youth suicides but not total suicides.  In states where income 
increased least, the youth suicide rate rose more.  Further, the magnitude of the coefficient on 
income is very similar in the two youth-suicide models.  In contrast, income has no effect on 
total suicides in the state model but is associated with suicide for adults in the cross-county 
model (the coefficient from the regression for adults equivalent to column (5) is –11.60 (2.35)). 
 
The coefficient on the female divorce rate is positive but not statistically significant.  Compared 
to Table 10, the magnitude is less than one-third as large.  Increased female divorce rates are also 
positively related to overall suicides, but not statistically significantly. In contrast, the female 35     
 
labor force participation rate is significantly related to increases in youth suicide rates.  A 7 
percent increase in female labor force participation rates (roughly one standard deviation in the 
cross section) raises youth suicide rates by 2 per 100,000.   This effect is not found for total 
suicides, only for youths.  This finding is different from the cross-county evidence, where female 
labor force participation is not related to youth suicides. 
 
The last two columns differentiate between male and female youth suicides.  The coefficients on 
income, divorce rates, and especially female labor force participation are greater for male 
suicides than for female suicides.  Since male suicide rates have increased more than female 
suicide rates, this suggests these results may contribute to the true explanation for rising suicide 
among youths. 
 
Explaining the Rise in Youth Suicide 
The natural question is which of these factors (if any) can explain the increase in youth suicide 
over time.  We use our cross-county regressions to address this, since we have more observations 
and controls with these data.  This estimate also allows us to see how well a cross-sectional 
analysis can predict a time series change, a valuable exercise in itself.  
 




j j j X Suicide β ) Pr(  where i indexes all of the factors that determine suicide, then 
∑ ∆ = ∆
i i i X ) Suicide Pr( β .  Thus, using our estimate of the importance of factors from the 
previous section, we will ask whether the change in observable variables is large enough to 
justify the observed overall change in suicide.  
 
The AddHealth data suggested four variables which might seem to be robustly correlated with 
suicidal behavior at magnitudes which could explain the general rise in suicide: depression; 
delinquency; relationships with parents; and drug use.  The cross-county analysis suggests that 
cross-sectional differences in teen suicide rates may be related to divorce rates, and both the 
AddHealth data and the cross-county data suggest that peer pressure or social contagion may 
amplify the effects of particular social stressors, so that adolescents may be affected by  
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community factors such as the divorce rate even if their own individual families are not directly 
involved. 
  
Since there is no really convincing data on teen depression over time, we know of no direct way 
to evaluate whether the rising suicide rates have resulted from rising levels of teen depression.  




Delinquency and drug use have both risen significantly across this time period.  We do not have 
good data on drug usage increase and as such, the importance of drugs cannot be estimated.  As 
shown above, there is a relation between the time series movements of teen homicide and teen 
suicide.  However, we cannot think about the changes in drug use, delinquency, and homicide as 
exogenous variation, so we leave this issue for further study.   
 
Finally, although we have no national measures of the relationship between parents and children, 
we can measure the divorce rate.  Between 1950 and 1990 the divorce rate rose from 2.3 percent 
to 8.8 percent.   If we use the coefficient estimate from the third column of Table 10, this 
suggests that there should have been an increase of 7.22 teenage suicides per 100,000 due to the 
increase in the divorce rate.  The actual increase was 10.5 suicides.  Thus, if we believe this 
coefficient estimate and if we treat the increase in the divorce rate as an exogenous variable, the 
rise in the divorce rate can explain more than two-thirds of the rise in teenage suicide.   
 
Some confirmation of this theory is provided by aggregate time series evidence.  Figure 9 shows 
divorce rates and suicide rates in the 20
th century.  In the first half of the century, the two do not 
seem to be highly correlated.  Divorce rates were very low and rose only modestly (from 1 to 2 
percent, exclusive of the post-World War II spike), while youth suicide rates had a general 
downward trend.  Since 1950, however, divorce rates and suicide rates track each other closely.  
Both were flat in the 1950s, rose in the late 1960s, and plateaued in the mid-1990s.  It may be 
                                                 
13  Of course, this evidence is a statement about the median of the distribution, not the lower tail. 37     
 
that when divorce rates were high enough to be a significant factor in community life, trends in 
divorce rates became a significant driving factor for youths. 
 
Clearly, these regressions and calculations should be taken with numerous shakers of salt, but 
they suggest that there is at least one coherent theory which can explain the basic facts.  At a 





Youth suicide rates have tripled in the past three decades, and there are as many as 400 attempted 
suicides for every suicide completion.  Why the epidemic in youth suicide?   
 
Our analysis of youth suicide attempts and completions leads us to three conclusions.  First, we 
find that suicide attempts are quite different from actual suicides, and lend themselves to a 
strategic suicide model.  We interpret many youth suicide attempts as signals of need or as ways 
to punish altruistic parents or other adults.  Other suicide attempts are a result of bad things that 
happen to youths; the link between delinquency, drug use, sexual activity, victimization, and 
suicide is clear and strong.  Some of these reflect the bad outcome of risks that youths take, while 
others may be simply a product of the environments in which youths are raised. 
 
It is harder to determine empirically whether completed suicides are the result of what we might 
consider to be strategic motivations.  But we have found evidence for certain common factors 
which may have influenced the dramatic rise in youth suicide and what has probably been a rise 
in suicide attempts. The most important of these variables is the female divorce rate.  In areas 
where more women are divorced, youth suicides are greater.  This effect is large; if one takes the 
increase in divorce rates over time, one can explain as much as two-thirds of the increase in 
youth suicides. 
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Social “contagion” also plays a particularly important role in teen suicide and parasuicide. We 
find individual-level evidence of contagion in the AddHealth data, and statistical evidence of 
non-random clustering in the county-level vital statistics. Contagion may involve the direct 
influence of one teen’s suicidal behavior on another, or it may involve more indirect social and 
cultural processes, but in either case these “neighborhood effects” may multiply the effects of 
government policies or other exogenous shocks. 
 
Economic opportunity plays a mixed role. The strategic suicide model predicts that suicidal 
behavior may increase under circumstances when there are greater resources to be accessed. On 
the other hand, rising labor force participation may have had a protective effect for young 
women, and higher income is associated with reductions in suicide at the county level. 
 
The factors that we have identified all deserve more research, but we are reasonably certain that 
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Appendix: The Strategic Suicide Theory 
 
We show in this appendix that if parents have no knowledge about child utility and if transfers 
substitute for innate happiness, a signaling equilibrium can exist where all children with Z<Z* 
engage in a suicide attempt, and all children with Z>Z* do not.   
 
Consider a case if Z* is the cutoff point for attempting suicide.  In this equilibrium, the transfers 
conditional upon attempting suicide solve U’(Y-T)=aE(V’(T,Z)|Z<Z*) and the transfers 
conditional upon not attempting suicide solve U’(Y-T)=aE(V’(T,Z)|Z>Z*).  We will denote the 
transfers conditional upon attempting suicide as  *) (Z T  and the transfers conditional on not 
attempting suicide as  *) (Z T  for the same Z*.    
 
Then Z* most be found so that individuals with that level of innate unhappiness (Z*) are 
indifferent between attempting suicide and not, i.e.  *) *), ( ( *) *), ( ( ) 1 ( Z Z T V Z Z T V d = − .  From 
the assumption d
2V/dTdZ<0 everyone with Z>Z* strictly prefers no suicide attempt and 
everyone where Z<Z* strictly prefers a suicide attempt.  In fact, because the prospect of loss of 
life becomes less important as the teen gets less happy, even with some (bounded) positive 
values of d
2V/dTdZ<0, it still will be the case that there is a single crossing property where the 
more unhappy gravitate towards suicide. 
 
 Finally, we must prove that there exists a level of Z* where this signaling equilibrium occurs.  In 
principle, this requires proving that there exists a level of Z* where   
*) *), ( ( *) *), ( ( ) 1 ( Z Z T V Z Z T V d − −  equals zero. We specifically assume that V(T,0)<0 so that 
the least happiest teenagers actually would commit suicide for non-strategic reasons and that 
Y V T dV * ) 1 , 0 ( ) 1 , ( 1 > , so that the happiest person would never commit suicide.  Furthermore, we 
assume that all of the derivatives of V(T,Z) are finite. From the concavity of V(.,.) it follows that: 
      
 
(1)
*) *), ( ( *)) ( *) ( *)( *)), ( (
*) *), ( ( *) *), ( ( ) 1 ( *) *), ( ( *)) ( *) ( *)( *)), ( (
1
1
Z Z T dV Z T Z T Z Z T V
Z Z T V Z Z T V d Z Z T dV Z T Z T Z Z T V
− − >
− − > − −
 
 
At Z*=0, the third term is clearly positive since V(T,Z)<0.  At Z*=1, the first term is clearly 
negative from  Y V T dV * ) 1 , 0 ( ) 1 , ( 1 > .    As such  *) *), ( ( *) *), ( ( ) 1 ( Z Z T V Z Z T V d − −  goes from 
negative to positive as Z* rises.  The function is always continuous, so there must be at least one 
fixed point, from standard arguments.  As such, as long as the happiest teenager will never 
attempt suicide and the least happy will always attempt suicide, there will exist an equilibrium 
where suicide serves as a signal.  (In fact, there may exist multiple equilibria in this case if the 
function  *) *), ( ( *) *), ( ( ) 1 ( Z Z T V Z Z T V d − −  
 
  
     
 
Appendix: The Rational Suicide Model 
To formalize the rational suicide model, we assume that individuals live three periods (young, 
midlife and old-age).  In each period, individuals receive a utility level equal to  t µ . Individuals 
learn the utility that they will receive at the start of each period and at that point make a decision 
whether to commit suicide or not.  Utility is assumed to follow a random walk:  t t t ε µ µ + = − 1 . 
For simplicity consider the possibility that  t ε  is a binary random variable which takes on values 
of ε  and -ε  with equal probability.  Individuals discount the future with a discount factor β  
(which includes the probability of death from other causes).  The expected utility from death is 
normalized to zero.   
 
In the last period, the individual commits suicide if  3 µ <0.  In the second period, the individual 
will commit suicide taking into account both current utility and the option value of living for a 
third period.  Thus, this individual will commit suicide if second period utility (if the individual 
doesn’t commit suicide) is  ) 2 /( 2 β β ε µ + − < .  In the first period, the individual will commit 
suicide if   ) 2 4 /( ) 2 (
2 2
1 β β ε β β µ + + + − < .   
 
Thus the first period suicide rate will be highest when random shocks are large or when 
discounting is very high.  Obviously anything that raises the mean level of unhappiness in the 
first period will also increase suicide. 
 
Just as the basic model predicts, the cutoff for suicide becomes progressively less stringent as 
people age.  The option value of living makes individuals less likely to respond to current 
happiness.  But this does not mean that individuals will commit more suicide as they age.  If F(.) 
describes the cumulative distribution of  1 µ  then the number of suicides in the first period will be 
( ) ) 2 4 /( ) 2 (
2 2 β β ε β β + + + − F .  The number of suicides in the second period will be 
() ( ) ( ) ) 2 4 /( ) 2 ( ) 2 /( 2 5 .
2 2 β β ε β β β ε + + + − − + F F .  There is no reason to think that the number 
of suicides will increase over time.  In the first period, individuals first learn their unhappiness 
and the optimal suicide strategy suggests that many of them should be expected to commit      
 
suicide initially, as long as there is significant persistence in happiness levels.  Further algebra 
also shows that it is quite possible that the suicide rate declines between youth and middle age 
and then rises again in old age.   
 
It is worth emphasizing that in the rational actor model, individuals in the future will be grateful 
if the marginal suicide is prevented.  The marginal suicide is sacrificing a positive future 
expected utility to alleviate current unhappiness.  Thus, the inter-temporal intra-personal conflict 
that is most associated with suicide occurs with exponential discounting.   
 
With hyperbolic discounting, it will be the case that individuals would like to commit themselves 
not to commit suicide at some point in the future.  For example in the above model, if 
discounting is hyperbolic so that individuals discount one period ahead by a factor β δ  then the 
suicide cutoff in the second period will be  ) 2 /( 2 β δ β δε µ + − < .  However, with hyperbolic 
discounting, individuals in period one discount periods two and three by β  so in period one 
individuals would like to ensure that they will commit suicide only if  ) 2 /( 2 β β ε µ + − < .  As 
such, in period one, individuals would like to prevent themselves from committing suicide in the 
future in some cases.   
 